Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
DEC 22 1975
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-8721

ZORA H. GILLAM,

Respondent,

v.

THE ADMIRAL CORPORATION,

Petitioner.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RALPH F. MITCHELL

907 Central Trust Tower
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
513/621-6251

RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY & DENNIS

907 Central Trust Tower
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

OF COUNSEL:

COURT INDEX PRESS, INC. — 809 Walnut Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 — (513) 241-1480

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Petition for Writ of Certiorari	1
Opinion of the Courts Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Question Presented	2
Constitutional Provisions Involved	2
Statement of the Case	3
Reasons Relied Upon for Allowance of the Writ	3
First Point: The Decision of the Court Below Reversing the Judgment of the District Court Violates the Provisions of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States in that it fails to Give Full Faith and Credit to the Law of the State of Ohio as Expressed by Decisions of the Supreme Court of that State.	3
Second Point: The Decision of the Court Below in Reversing the Judgment of the District Court Violates the Provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it Permits the Levying of a Forfeiture or Penalty and the Taking of Property Without Due Process of Law.	7
Third Point: The Issue Herein Presented As to the Collectibility of Punitive Damages from the Manufacturer of an Allegedly Defective Product Is of General Interest to the Entire Manufacturing Industry.	9
Conclusion	12

APPENDIX

	Page
Order of U.S.D.C. Granting Motion N.O.V.	1a
Order of U.S.D.C. Amending Judgment Entry	7a
Entry of Satisfaction in U.S.D.C.	9a
Opinion of U.S.C.A. for Sixth Circuit	10a
Judgment Entry of U.S.C.A. for Sixth Circuit	23a
Order of U.S.C.A. for Sixth Circuit Denying Rehearing and Hearing In Banc	25a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page
Columbus Finance, Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2nd 178 (1975)	5, 6
Davis v. Tunison, 168 Ohio St. 471 (1959)	6
Donahey v. Edmondson, 89 Ohio St. 93 (1913)	5, 6
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)	6, 11
Hudson v. Moonier, 304 U.S. 397 (1938)	6
New York Life Insurance Company v. Jackson, 304 U.S. 261 (1938)	6
Perkins v. Banquet Consolidated Mining Company, 342 U.S. 437 (1952)	5
Pickle v. Swinehart (1960), 170 Ohio St. 441	6
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 Fed. 2d 832 (1967)	11
Rosenthal v. New York Life Insurance Company, 304 U.S. 263 (1938)	6
Smithhisler v. Dutter, 157 Ohio St. 454 (1952)	4, 5, 6
West v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 311 U.S. 223 (1940)	6
Consumer Product Safety Act, Public Law 91-573 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2051)	8
Ohio Revised Code, Section 2503.20	4-5

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. ———

ZORA H. GILLAM,

Respondent,

v.

THE ADMIRAL CORPORATION,

Petitioner.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

TO THE HONORABLE, The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Petitioner, the Admiral Corporation, respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the final judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered on September 25, 1975, reversing the judgment of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. The said appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was docketed as number 74-1398.

OPINION OF THE COURTS BELOW

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio entered its Order January 9, 1974 (1a) granting petitioner's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

and, pursuant thereto on January 17, 1974, entered its Order Amending the Judgment Entry. (7a) The Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is recorded in 523 F. 2d *102* (10a).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on September 5, 1975. (23a). The Order of that court denying rehearing and hearing en banc was entered November 12, 1975. (25a) The jurisdiction of this Court is envoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the judgment of the District Court as to punitive damages and attorney fees, failed to follow the law of Ohio as expressed by the Supreme Court of Ohio.

Does the decision of the Court of Appeals constitute the levying of a forfeiture or penalty without due process of law.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S.C. Constitution Article IV. Section 1.

"Full faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of every other State."

U.S.C. Constitution Amendment V.

". . . nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This litigation originated as a diversity action filed by Zora H. Gillam against The Admiral Corporation for injuries sustained in a fire in Mrs. Gillam's home in Cincinnati, Ohio, allegedly resulting from a defective condition in a color television set manufactured by Admiral. In September, 1972, two years after commencement of the action, Plaintiff was permitted, over objection, to amend her Complaint to seek punitive damages and attorney fees.

In a bifurcated trial the issue of liability was found in favor of Plaintiff. The issue of damages was then tried to the same jury and defendant's motion for directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages and attorney fees was taken under submission and verdicts were returned in Plaintiff's favor for $125,000.00 compensatory damages, $100,000.00 punitive damages and $50,000.00 attorney fees. Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to punitive damages and attorney fees. That motion was granted by the District Court (1a) and the judgment amended accordingly (7a). Thereafter the compensatory damages of $125,000.00 were paid by Defendant and an Entry of Satisfaction placed of record. (9a). An appeal was taken by Plaintiff to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and that Court reversed the judgment of the District Court and reinstated the judgment for Plaintiff as to punitive damages and attorney fees.

REASONS RELIED UPON FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT

First Point: The Decision of the Court Below Reversing the Judgment of the District Court Violates the Provisions of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States in that it fails to Give Full Faith and Credit to the Law of the State of Ohio as Expressed by Decisions of the Supreme Court of that State.

This was an action having as its jurisdictional basis diversity of citizenship. There was no reliance nor basis for reliance

upon Federal law as to any substantive issue in the case. State law was controlling as to all issues including the collectibility of punitive damages and attorney fees. It has at no time been suggested that any law other than the law of Ohio should control that question.

The law of Ohio as it relates to the availability of punitive damages in a civil action is, we submit, well settled. The controlling precedent on that issue is stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the first paragraph of the syllabus in *Smithhisler* v. *Dutter*, 157 O.S. 454 as follows:

> "In tort actions the question of punitive damages may not ordinarily be submitted to a jury in the absence of actual malice."

It is respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeals in the instant case either failed to recognize the *Smithhisler* statement as the controlling Ohio law or misinterpreted and extended the *Smithhisler* statement by reading into it a possibility that malice may be inferred. It would appear. in fact, that the Court of Appeals did both.

The status of the above quoted statement from *Smithhisler* as the law of Ohio rests upon the long recognized rule of *stare decisis* in this state set down by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1858 as follows:

> "A syllabus of the points decided by the Court in each case, shall be stated, in writing, by the Judge assigned to deliver the opinion of the Court, which shall be confined to the points of law, arising from the facts of the case, that have been determined by the Court. The syllabus shall be submitted to the Judges concurring therein, for revisal, before publication thereof; and it shall be inserted in the book of reports without alterations, unless by the consent of the Judges concurring therein." 5 Ohio St. (vii)

This statement of policy has been continually recognized and codified to and including the present Ohio Revised Code

Section 2503.20. It has also been the subject of repeated judicial recognition of which the following is an example:

> "It has long been the rule of this Court that the syllabus contains the law of the case. It is the only part of the opinion requiring the approval of all the members concurring in the judgment. Where the Judge writing the opinion discusses matters or gives expression to his views on questions not contained in the syllabus, it is merely the personal opinion of that Judge." State ex rel *Donahey* v. *Edmondson*, 89 O.S. 93

This Court had occasion to recognize Ohio's judicial policy which recognizes the syllabus as the official opinion of the Court in the case of *Perkins* v. *Benquet Consolidated Mining Company*, 342 U.S. 437.

It must therefore be said unequivocally that the Ohio law referable to the availability of punitive damages is that stated in *Smithhisler* v. *Dutter* which has at no time been overruled, limited or otherwise qualified by any subsequent syllabus of any Ohio Supreme Court case.

The fact that the Court of Appeals in this case failed to recognize that prevailing Ohio rule is obvious from the manner in which it made reference to and quoted from the case of *Columbus Finance, Inc.* v. *Howard*. The Court of Appeals characterized the *Columbus Finance* case as holding ". . . that Ohio law required a finding of fraud, insult, or malice to sustain punitive damages, but that 'actual malice may be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances'" (19a). In fact, the only statement of Ohio law referable to punitive damages in *Columbus Finance* was the first paragraph of the syllabus.

> "In an action for wrongful execution, actual malice, fraud or insult upon the part of the wrongdoer must be shown in order to justify an award of punitive damages."

The qualifying statement which was quoted by the Court of Appeals was not contained in the syllabus but in the opinion

and was, therefore, to use the language of the *Donahey* case, "merely the personal opinion of that Judge."

Further, it should be called to the Court's attention that the Court of Appeals' only reference to *Smithhisler* indicates that it was treated by the Ohio Supreme Court in *Columbus Finance* "... as an exception to the general rules regarding punitive damages, to be applied in cases involving alienation of affection of a spouse." (20a) In fact, the "treatment" given *Smithhisler* in the *Columbus Finance* opinion was the following:

> "The parties disagree as to the general description of conduct which constitutes malice sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages. Appellee contends that an award of punitive damages is proper only if 'actual malice' on the part of the wrongdoer is shown. There is case law which directly supports that position. *Davis* v. *Tunison,* supra; *Pickle* v. *Swinehart* (1960), 170 O.S. 441, 166 N.E. 2d 277. *See, also, Smithhisler* v. *Dutter (1952), 157 Ohio St. 454, 105 N.E. 2d 868, in which this court recognized that actual malice is ordinarily required in order to sustain an award of punitive damages, but that an exception is made for cases involving alienation of affection of a spouse.*" (Emphasis added)

Beginning with *Erie Railroad Co.* v. *Tompkins,* 304 U.S. 64 this Court has established and continuously enforced the duty upon all Federal Courts in diversity actions to apply to the issue therein the applicable State law *(New York Life Insurance Company* v. *Jackson,* 304 U.S. 261; *Rosenthal* v. *New York Life Insurance Company,* 304 U.S. 263; *Hudson* v. *Moonier,* 304 U.S. 397; et seq.). This judicial duty was well expressed in *West* v. *American Telephone and Telegraph Company,* 311 U.S. 223 in which this Court called for the application of Ohio law by the federal court:

> "State law is to be applied in the Federal as well as State Courts and it is the duty of the former in every case to ascertain from all the available data what the State law is and apply it rather than to prescribe a different rule, however superior it may appear from the viewpoint of 'general law' and however much the State rule may have departed from prior decisions of the Federal Court."

It is obvious that the Court of Appeals in the present case failed to observe and follow this precept.

Second Point: The Decision of the Court Below in Reversing the Judgment of the District Court Violates the Provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it Permits the Levying of a Forfeiture of Penalty and the Taking of Property Without Due Process of Law.

In Ohio as in most other jurisdictions punitive damages do not have as their purpose the providing of compensation for the injured litigant. Their purpose is to punish or penalize the wrongdoer who has been guilty of some malicious act. Punitive damages do, therefore, in fact, constitute a penalty or forfeiture levied against the Defendant for much the same purpose and in much the same manner that a fine or penalty is assessed against a Defendant in a criminal case.

One very significant difference exists, however, between the assessment of punitive damages in a civil case and the levying of a fine or forfeiture in a criminal matter. In the latter situation the statute creating the crime must define those acts which constitute violation of it with sufficient clarity and certainty as to apprise any potential Defendant of those acts which will and those acts which will not render him subject to the assessment of the prescribed punishment.

By contrast, the Court of Appeals in the present case has said that punitive damages may be assessed against a Defendant in any situation in which the evidence would permit the jury "to infer" malice on the part of the Defendant. It is respectfully submitted that such a rule affords no definition of the acts to be punished. What the rule in fact does is to charge the jury not only with the responsibility of finding

whether or not a punishable act has been committed but also of determining and defining what is a punishable act.

A second significant distinction between a criminal fine or penalty on the one hand and the assessment of punitive damages in a civil action on the other lies in the fact that a criminal statute, in addition to defining the criminal act, must also establish the punishment that will or may be leveyed against a Defendant found guilty of violation. Such certainly is not the case in the assessment of punitive damages. The jury in the civil action is left entirely without guidelines in assessing punitive damages. It is left, in fact, with nothing but unbridled speculation assisted by the imagination of Plaintiff's counsel whose client will be the beneficiary of the jury's largess.

We do not suggest that a manufacturer's actions should be exempt from supervision or that he should be immune from penalty if he has acted in a manner that would make penalty appropriate. We do submit, however, that every person, firm or corporation is entitled to an understandable definition of those acts which are punishable and knowledge of what that punishment will be. The solution to those problems must be found through legislation. That fact has been recognized and Congress has undertaken the establishment of control, supervision and penalty. As an example we direct the Court's attention to the Consumer Product Safety Act, Public Law 92-573, enacted by Congress October 27, 1972. (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2051).

It is argued that one of the functions of punitive damages is to deter the Defendant and, by example, others similarly situated from engaging in those activities for which punitive damages are assessed. We respectfully suggest that Congress has undertaken that task and that the assessment of punitive damage under these circumstances would, at best, be duplicative of the congressional effort.

Third Point: The Issue Herein Presented As to the Collectibility of Punitive Damages from the Manufacturer of an Allegedly Defective Product Is of General Interest to the Entire Manufacturing Industry.

The effect of the decision by the Court of Appeals in this case and the need for review and statement by this Court is of such magnitude as to be incapable of exaggeration. If allowed to stand, the decision of the Court below subjects every manufacturer of every product to a very real threat of financial annihilation.

The increased activity in products liability litigation over the past ten to fifteen years is a well recognized fact and can be described, in many respects, as expansive or even explosive. The theories of liability to which manufacturers have been subjected have gone first from warranty to negligence; then from negligence to warranty without privity; then from warranty without privity to strict liability without negligence. Along the way products liability law has assumed such additional elements as failure to warn, failure to guard against injury in the event of accident and the like. At the same time the defenses available to the manufacturer have been catastrophically eroded. In many jurisdictions recognizing strict liability it avails the Defendant nothing to prove the exercise of ordinary case or that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent or that the Plaintiff voluntarily assumed a known risk.

At the same time that the theory of liability against manufacturers was being expanded and the defenses available to them were being diminished the awards for compensatory damages were multiplying as much as a hundred fold. Still, as staggering as the availability and amount of compensatory awards had become, the manufacturing community retained some hope of guarding itself against disaster by instituting additional safeguards in design and quality control on the one hand and reserving and/or insuring against claims on the other. So long as claimants were required to prove the existance of a defect and so long as the damages awarded

had to be commensurate with the injuries suffered, manufacturers still might be capable of dealing with the problem within the limitations of fiscal possibility.

The allowance of punitive damages, as permitted by the Court of Appeals in this case, creates a new and virtually uncontrollable threat. It is entirely predictable that, if the principle as expressed by the Court below is permitted to become a part of the body of law governing products liability cases, many of the thousands of pending cases will be amended to pray for punitive damages and that that prayer will become a routine part of all new filings. Few Plaintiffs will pass up the opportunity for this bonanza and their attorneys will certainly feel compelled to seek the attorney fees that are an available adjunct to a punitive damage prayer.

With every product that a manufacturer produces, in addition to bearing the burden of complying with the many industry and governmental standards, and in addition to bearing the burden of foreseeing every possible circumstance under which any user or member of the public might sustain any injury, the manufacturer would further be confronted with the fear and threat that some jury, permitted the luxury of speculation, might infer some recklessness or wantonness that would pave the way for a punitive damage award. The insidiousness of this threat, aside from its basis in inference, lies in the fact that it bears no relation to the injuries sustained by Plaintiff and is limited only by the financial condition of the Defendant and therefore carries with it, in each and every case, the possibility of financial ruin.

The availability of punitive damages would have additional and seriously detrimental effects upon all manufacturers. The spector of the inferences that a jury might draw from any and every word and deed documented in its files would, of necessity, create such a deterent to the exchange and discussion of new ideas as to impede innovative and improve development. Every change discussed would have in it the dual seed of incriminating the earlier design if adopted or the ignoring of a preferred method if rejected.

Judge Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had occasion to consider the availability of punitive damages in a products liability situation in the case of *Roginsky* v. *Richardson-Merrell, Inc.*, 378 Fed 2d 832. The District Court in that case permitted a punitive damage award in favor of Plaintiff who had sustained cataract damage as the result of taking medication developed and marketed by Defendant. Judge Friendly reversed the jury verdict as to punitive damages. The majority opinion is a lengthy one but, we submit, deserves review for the thoroughness with which it treats the question here presented. The depth of consideration and careful treatment given this question by Judge Friendly is, we submit, in stark contrast to the Court of Appeals opinion in the present case. Clearly, Judge Friendly recognized the judicial duty imposed upon him to follow the law of the State. At page 841 of the Opinion he states:

> ". . . the *Erie* Doctrine wisely prevents our engaging in such extensive lawmaking on local tort liability, a subject which the people of New York have entrusted to their legislators and, within appropriate limits, to their own Courts, not to us.

Exercising judicial restraint Judge Friendly, at page 837 of the Opinion, recognized the magnitude of the question:

> "Given our limited capacity as predictors of New York law, we would prefer to avoid decision of such a weighty and difficult issue, with wide ramifications as to other products, even if we permissibly can."

The present case is no less weighty nor is it infected with any less significant ramifications as to other products and other manufacturers than was the *Roginsky* case.

The issue submitted certainly is not limited to the parties to this case. Its effect will be felt by all manufacturers of all products not only nationwide but worldwide. It is a question that deserves and entreats this Court's attention.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals failed to observe its judicial duty to recognize and follow the law of Ohio as stated by its highest Court. In so doing it engrafted upon body of products liability law a principle which threatens all manufacturers of all products to unlimited punitive damage awards which would threaten financial annihilation.

Respectfully submitted,

RALPH F. MITCHELL

907 Central Trust Tower
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
513/621-6251

RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY & DENNIS

907 Central Trust Tower
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

OF COUNSEL:

APPENDIX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Civil No. 4449

ZORA H. GILLHAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE ADMIRAL CORPORATION,

Defendant.

ORDER

(Filed January 9, 1974)

This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to arrest from the jury evidence with reference to punitive damages and to enter judgment in its favor on that issue. The motion was seasonably made and was taken under submission by the Court in accordance with Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial of the above matter was bifurcated in accordance with Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability, the jury considered the matter of damages. It assessed as damages the sum of One Hundred Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00) compensatory damages; One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) punitive damages; and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) reasonable attorney fees. The motion of defendant will be considered as relating only to the award of punitive damages and the award of reasonable attorney fees.

This is a products liability case. The plaintiff sustained burns fighting a fire in her apartment which originated in a television set manufactured by the defendant. Evidence was presented that prior to the fire, defendant had notice of approximately 91 complaints regarding smoke or fire in television sets similar to that purchased by the plaintiff. These complaints extended over a substantial period of time. Evidence was likewise presented of a potential fire hazard in a component part known as the horizontal output transformer. Further evidence was presented that safety precautions intended to confine a potential fire within the horizontal output transformer were ineffective and that this, too, was within the knowledge of the defendant.

The evidence can reasonably be interpreted to indicate that the defendant was negligent and even grossly negligent in its design of the television set, in its subsequent activities, and in its failure to warn customers of the potential fire hazard. The sole question before the Court, however, is whether such evidence viewed in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff, entitled the plaintiff to an award for punitive damages. The Court thinks not.

There are few cases on the subject of punitive damages in product liability cases. Neither the courts of Ohio nor the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have addressed themselves directly to this question. For assistance we must turn to the case of *Roginsky* v. *Richardson-Merrill, Inc.*, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). The classical terms of "well-reasoned" and "well-considered" only partially describe the opinion of Chief Judge Friendly. It is all that, but even more it is a definitive discussion of punitive damages as they relate to product liability cases. The *Roginsky* case involves the production of a drug known as MER29. This drug was marketed by the defendant therein to reduce elevated cholesterol in the blood stream. While it was an exceptionally effective drug, it apparently also produced as a side effect, cataracts in some of its users. The plaintiff Roginsky sought

punitive damages as well as compensatory damages. The Court held that under New York law, the moral culpability which supports punitive damages for non-intentional torts is "utter recklessness or wanton, malicious, gross, or outrageous conduct." While it is only of secondary importance, the conduct of the Richardson-Merrill Co. included a non-disclosure of certain clinical experiments as well as a deliberate falsification of others.

What, then, is the standard under Ohio law for the imposition of punitive damages? The courts of this state have long recognized that punitive damages may in proper cases be recovered. A recognition of it appeared first in *Roberts* v. *Mason*, 10 Ohio St. 277 (1859). The Supreme Court of Ohio cited and followed *Roberts* v. *Mason* in *Saberton* v. *Greenwald*, 146 Ohio St. 414 (1946). In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court which had denied punitive damages and held: "In action to recover damages for tort which include the ingredients of fraud, malice or insult, the jury may go beyond the rules of mere compensation of the party aggrieved and award exemplary or punitive damages." Subsequently, the Supreme Court in *Smithhisler* v. *Dutter*, 157 Ohio St. 454 (1952), commented upon a dissent of Judge Hart in the *Saberton* case and pointed out that there was no division upon the following statement: "This court has over the years recognized the propriety of submitting to a jury the question of assessment of punitive damages in certain tort cases where the defendant's wrongdoing *has been intentional and deliberate or has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.*" [Emphasis added] In *Rogers* v. *Barbera*, 170 Ohio St. 241, the Supreme Court of Ohio observed that conduct could be either "wanton" or "reckless" and still not have been actuated by malice or ill will.

None of the foregoing involves product liability cases. So far as this Court can determine, neither its research nor that of plaintiff and defendant have disclosed any Ohio cases. An

annotation in 29 A.L.R. 3d 1071 lists only three cases: one of which is from Alabama and the other two cases concerning MER29. They are the *Roginsky* case above mentioned and the *Toole* case from the state courts of California.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has considered punitive damages in other contexts. In the case of *U.S. Steel Corp.* v. *Fuhrman*, 407 F.2d 1143 (1969), that Court reversed an award of punitive damages in a situation involving a collision of two vessels on Lake Michigan. It should be noted that the opinion of the trial court reported in 276 F. Supp. 163 detailed a fact situation of such apparent disregard for the lives and safety of seamen as to border upon criminal negligence. In a recent case dealing with trade secrets, that Court sustained an award of punitive damages. *W. R. Grace & Company* v. *Hargadine*, 392 F.2d 9 (1968).

In speaking for a unanimous court, Judge Edwards cited and followed the view in *Aladdin Mfg. Co.* v. *Mantle Lamp Co.*, 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941) that: "Exemplary damages are allowed against a tort feasor which acts are intentionally fraudulent, malicious, wilful or wanton." Admittedly, neither *Grace*, *U.S. Steel*, nor *Signer* involved product liability, but all indicate a consistent view of punitive damages conceptionally equivalent to that of the Second Circuit in the *Roginsky* case. As recently as 1972 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit again stated its views on this subject. In *Signer* v. *First National Bank & Trust Company of Covington*, 455 F.2d 382 (1972), the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of punitive damages and stated: "Such damages are given only on account of the wanton, reckless, malicious or offensive character of the acts complained of."

It may well be that the Admiral Corporation took a cavalier attitude toward the complaints leveled at its product. The evidence of such complaints was primarily the consumer letters and responses by officials of Admiral. The letters of complaint were admitted into evidence in accordance with

the recommendation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in *Gardner* v. *Q.H.S., Inc.*, 448 F.2d 244. No evidence of fire subsequent to that which injured the plaintiff was admitted and plaintiff elected not to present evidence supporting the letters of complaint. Not all of the incidents related involved the transformer, nor did all of the complaints involve fires. There is no doubt, however, that the Admiral Corporation relied on its initial design of the television set and made no effort to warn any of its dealers or customers that a potential hazard did exist. Breach of implied warranty and failure to warn were properly determined by the jury against the defendant.

Something more must be embraced by the words such as "utter recklessness", "wantonness", "outrageous conduct", etc. While there are abvious dictionary distinctions among these words, they all connote the same general conduct. There must be acts so shocking that one is left with a feeling of outrage and a determination to punish. If a comparative concept must be selected, it is that of punishment for violation of law rather than recompense for a negligent act.

It may be that some court will find an objective standard against which conduct can be judged for determining that which warrants the imposition of punitive damages. Until that time arrives, trial courts can only rely upon the representative words that have been used traditionally in an effort to describe what is basically an indescribable concept.

When the evidence of conduct of the Admiral Corporation is considered in terms of the conduct of the Richardson-Merrill Company in *Roginsky* and in terms of the conduct of U.S. Steel in *Fuhrman*, it does not assume proportions that invite either punishment or example. Accordingly, the motion of defendant will be GRANTED and judgment n.o.v. on the issue of punitive damages will be GRANTED in defendant's favor.

Since reasonable attorney fees may only be granted in a situation where punitive damages are awarded, *Davis* v. *Tunison*, 168 Ohio St. 471 (1959), judgment n.o.v. as to such attorney fees will likewise be GRANTED.

The parties are directed to present to the Court within ten (10) days of the date of this Opinion, a judgment order consistent with the terms hereof.

/s/ CARL B. RUBIN
United States District Judge

It is so ORDERED.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CIVIL ACTION No. 4449

ZORA H. GILLHAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE ADMIRAL CORPORATION,

Defendant,

ORDER AMENDING JUDGMENT ENTRY

(Received January 17, 1974)

Judgment having been entered herein on December 19, 1973, on jury verdicts of compensatory damages in the amount of $125,000.00, punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00 and attorney fees in the amount of $50,000.00 to the Plaintiff and the Court, by Order of January 9, 1974, having granted Judgment NOV in favor of the Defendant on the issue of punitive damages and having granted Judgment NOV in favor of the Defendant as to attorney fees,

NOW, THEREFORE, the Judgment entered December 19, 1973, is hereby amended as follows:

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant in the amount of $125,00.00 as compensatory damages, together with her costs herein expended, and

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Defendant and against Plaintiff, pursuant to this Court's Order of January 9, 1974, on the issue of punitive damages and in accordance

therewith the verdict of the jury rendered December 19, 1973, is hereby set aside insofar as it awarded punitive damages and attorney fees in favor of the Plaintiff.

/s/ JOHN A. LLOYD, JR.
Attorney for Plaintiff
2900 DuBois Tower
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

OF COUNSEL: FROST & JACOBS

/s/ RALPH F. MITCHELL
Attorney for Defendant
907 Central Trust Tower
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

OF COUNSEL:
RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY & DENNIS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Civil Action Nos. 4449 & 7674

ZORA H. GILLHAM,
Plaintiff,

v.

THE ADMIRAL CORPORATION,
Defendant,

ENTRY OF SATISFACTION

(Filed March 1, 1975)

Judgment having been heretofore rendered on January 22, 1974, in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant for compensatory damages in the sum of One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand and 00/100 ($125,000.00) Dollars; and said sum having been fully paid by Defendant to Plaintiff, this satisfaction may be entered of record with reference thereto. Costs up to this time are to be borne by the Defendant. This satisfaction is without prejudice to plaintiff's appeal on the questions of punitive damages and attorneys' fees.

/s/ JOHN A. LLOYD, JR.
Trial Attorney for Plaintiff
2900 DuBois Tower
511 Walnut Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
513/621-8550

OF COUNSEL:
FROST & JACOBS

/s/ RALPH F. MITCHELL
Trial Attorney for Defendant
907 Central Trust Tower
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
513/621-6251

OF COUNSEL:
RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY & DENNIS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 74-1398

ZORA H. GILLHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE ADMIRAL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.

ON APPEAL from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division.

Decided and Filed September 25, 1975.

Before: PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, McCREE, Circuit Judge, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.

McCREE, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from an order granting a motion for judgment *n.o.v.* setting aside an award of punitive damages and attorneys' fees in a produces liability action brought to recover damages for injuries caused by a fire in a television set designed and manufactured by The Admiral Corporation (Admiral). Two issues are presented for review: (1) whether the district court erred in concluding that no reasonable person could have found that Admiral's conduct in designing and marketing the television was intentional, reckless, wanton, willful or gross so as to justify the award of punitive damages and attorneys' fees; and (2) whether the district court erred in excluding evidence of Admiral's conduct after appellant's injury, offered to show Admiral's state of mind or intent as a predicate for punitive damages.

We hold that the district court erred in granting the motion

for judgment *n.o.v.* because there was sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable person to conclude that Admiral's conduct permitted an award of punitive damages and attorneys' fees. Accordingly, we need not decide whether evidence of Admiral's conduct after appellant's injury should have been admitted.

Appellant, Zora Gilham, brought this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against appellee, The Admiral Corporation, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for severe burns and other serious and crippling injuries caused by a fire originating in her Admiral color television set. Jurisdiction is under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on diversity of citizenship and damages exceeding $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs. The parties agree that the law of Ohio applies.

The issues of liability and damages were tried separately pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the conclusion of the liability phase of the trial, the jury found Admiral liable for Mrs. Gillham's injuries. Thereafter, the claims for compensatory and punitive damages were tried to the same jury. The court permitted the question of punitive damages to go to the jury despite Admiral's motion for a directed verdict on this issue. That motion was taken under advisement in accordance with Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $125,000.00, punitive damages of $100,000.00, and attorneys' fees of $50,000.00.

On January 29, 1974, within a month of the conclusion of the trial, the court granted Admiral's motion for judgment *n.o.v.*, setting aside the award of punitive damages and attorneys' fees. In its order, the court stated that the evidence could

> reasonably be interpreted to indicate that the defendant was negligent and even grossly negligent in its design of the television set, in its subsequent activities, and in its failure to warn customers of the potential fire hazard.

It also concluded that Admiral was guilty of a breach of implied warranty.[1] However, it held that Admiral's conduct was not sufficiently reckless, wanton or outrageous to warrant an award of punitive damages.

The facts are not disputed. Mrs. Gillham purchased an Admiral television set with a 24A2 chassis in June 1964. On the evening of November 19, 1968, she watched a television program in her apartment for about an hour, turned the set off, and observed a blue flash come across the television screen, and left the room. She returned to the room about fifteen minutes later to find the television set on fire with flames rising almost to the ceiling. She attempted to beat out the fire with sofa pillows but when she heard an explosion, she called the fire department. She was severely burned by the flames, which had spread to her doorway by the time

---

[1] As the opinion later discusses, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated in some of its opinions that unlawful conduct is an element of a cause of action wherein an award of punitive damages is sought. The district court apparently found only that Admiral's conduct lacked the element of willfulness necessary for an award of punitive damages, and did not consider the element of unlawfulness. We observe that the requisite unlawfulness may be found where a defect in a product breaches a warranty imposed by law. *E.g.*., *Craig* v. *Spitzer Motors*, 109 Ohio App. 376, 160 N.E. 2d 537 (1959). In that case, an Ohio court of appeals, in reversing a judgment for the defendant, in an action based upon the seller's misrepresentation of the condition of a used automobile to the purchaser, observed that in Ohio the "obligation of an express warranty is one imposed by law and the action for its breach was originally considered to be in tort." 109 Ohio App. 380. In its opinion, the court also quoted with approval the following statement from 16 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), Section 146:

> In practically all kinds of contract violations, the courts in Ohio have sought to compensate the injured party, not to reward him. This rule does not obtain, however, in those exceptional cases where the breach amounts to an independent, willful tort, in which event exemplary damages may be recovered under proper allegations of malice, wantonness, or oppression . . . It is true, also that if the breach involves an infraction of a duty imposed by law, it may be thus punished. 109 Ohio App. 380.

she fled the apartment. Burns covered 18.5 percent of her body surface, and 11 percent of her skin was destroyed by third degree burns.

Her burns and the complications resulting from them required her to be hospitalized for 18 months and to have seven operations. The complications attributable to her burns included infection and inflamation of the burns, systemic toxicity, fever, secondary pneumonia, loss of appetite and malnutrition, an acute chronic urinary tract infection, acute pancreatitis, thrombophelbitis, colitis, and a gastrocolonic fistula, which permitted fecal matter to enter her stomach. Her injuries transformed Zora Gillham from an active and vivacious woman into a virtual invalid who requires twenty-four hour nursing care.

In addition to her out-of-pocket expenses of $128,000 for medical care up to the time of trial, the testimony of Dr. William Altemier indicated that as a result of these injuries each year for the rest of her life Mrs. Gillham could be expected to incur medical expenses of $1,000 plus the expenses for full-time nursing care, estimated at $262 per week or $13,624 per year.[2]

The evidence established that the fire in Mrs. Gillham's television set was caused by ignition of the set's high voltage transformer, a component also commonly called a horizontal output transformer (H.O.T.) or "flyback" transformer; that this transformer was defectively designed; that the design created a fire hazard; that that Admiral's officials and designers knew that the high voltage transformer in her set and in other Admiral color television sets of the same model was fire hazardous.

---

[2] Appellant's brief suggests that the jury's award of a total of $275,000, while in form including punitive damages and attorneys' fees, was actually intended only as compensatory damages for pain, suffering, and anticipated medical expenses in addition to out-of-pocket expenses of $128,000. This speculation, while interesting, is legally irrelevant.

Admiral began assembling color television sets of its own design in 1963. Its first color television chassis, consisting of all the electronic mechanisms except a picture tube, speakers or cabinet, was designated the "24" series. Mrs. Gillham's Admiral television contained a 24A2 chassis. Dr. Yon, appellant's expert witness, testified that the principal defect making the transformer in this model fire hazardous was the inclusion of unsuitable paper and wax materials. The paper was interleaved between the transformer windings. One wax compound was used to cover the core of the windings and another to cover the secondary windings.

Admiral made only one heat test on each of five transformers before releasing the design for production. These tests showed that the operating temperatures of the transformers ran from 118.2 degrees Centigrade to 126.2 degrees Centigrade. The American Institute of Electrical Engineering Standard Classification of Insulating Materials specifies that the type of paper insulation employed in this transformer may not be used at temperatures in excess of 105 degrees Centigrade. The temperatures recorded in the heat tests also exceeded the "cold flow" point of the wax comound used on the core, which was 115 degrees Centigrade, and came within three degrees of its softening point, which was 129 degrees Centigrade. In addition, the temperatures came within three degrees of 129° C. the cold flow point of the wax comprising the outside covering.

Dr. Yon further testified that exposing paper insulation to excessive temperatures and using wax at temperatures exceeding one cold flow distortion point and closely approaching other cold flow and softening points causes these materials to degrade seriously and to wear out much more quickly than expected in normal use. When the materials degrade, the paper cracks and splits, the wax flows out of the transformer core, and the insulation is destroyed at critical points in the transformer. This condition results in electrical failures causing fires from electrical shorts and electrical arcs, which, in turn,

ignite the flammable paper and wax. This fire hazard, Dr. Yon testified, should have been apparent to any reasonably prudent and qualified design engineer.

The high voltage transformer in plaintiff's television set was designed by Carl Olson, Project Manager of Admiral's Deflection Laboratory with the assistance of subordinates. Mr. Olson admitted at trial that at the time that he designed the transformer he had anticipated that it might catch fire in customers' homes. Therefore, he designed what Admiral calls a high voltage cage, a device enclosing the high voltage transformer and some other components of the high voltage section. The cage was intended to contain the expected fires. There was testimony that Admiral made two tests in which the transformer was set on fire with a torch, and when the cage was closed, it contained the flames. There was other evidence, however, indicating that it was unreasonable to expect that the cage would contain a fire for any length of time because there were 38 holes in the lid of the cage, an opening at the bottom of the cage, and plastic rivets fastening the cover.

Shortly after the television sets containing this transformer were marketed, Olson and Admiral learned that the wax insulation was melting and dripping out of the high voltage cages and even dripping out of the sets. Olson admitted that this information indicated that the transformers were operating at temperatures higher than Admiral had anticipated. Admiral also learned that fires were originating in its 24A2 chassis caused by the high voltage transformer, and that the fires were not being contained in the cage but were igniting the television sets. In some instances, the resulting fires destroyed home furnishings and dwellings, and caused personal injuries.

As early as October 1964 four customers reported to Admiral that fires had occurred in their Admiral color television sets. All four fires were high voltage fires. Thereafter, Admiral received a steady stream of complaints about fires originating in its color television sets. By November 1968 when

plaintiff's fire occurred, at least 91 such fires had been reported to Admiral.

Moreover, in November 1966, two years before the plaintiff's set caught fire, one of Admiral's transformer engineers conducted tests on 16 transformers returned by servicemen to Admiral. Every one of these transformers failed and burned. They all failed and burned in the same manner as the high voltage transformer in Mrs. Gillham's set because the paper and wax insulation failed.

All these transformers were identical in construction and insulation materials to the one in plaintiff's set. The engineer who conducted the tests commented, ". . . the wonder is that more failures did not occur." These tests confirmed customer complaints and demonstrated that many of the fires were caused by the high voltage transformers.

The evidence also disclosed that Admiral could feasibly have reduced this fire hazard substantially, or have eliminated it completely. Materials superior to the paper and wax were available for use as insulation in high voltage transformers long before Admiral designed its transformer in 1963, and these materials were used by other television manufacturers before 1963. Also, Admiral could have installed a fuse in the high voltage circuitry to cut off the electricity in the event of overheating.

The evidence thus demonstrated that when Admiral designed, manufactured and marketed appellant's television set it knew that the set presented a serious fire hazard. Nevertheless Admiral did not warn prospective purchasers or owners of the danger despite the steady flow of reported fires originating in Admiral color television sets. Nor did Admiral redesign this model or step marketing it during the period in question.

The evidence also disclosed that the highest officials of Admiral were aware of the fire hazard and its precise source and cause. I. F. Johnston, Admiral's Electronic Service Manager admitted that he knew that these transformers were the

"major source" of fires in Admiral color television sets. Summaries of the claims against Admiral arising from fires were circulated to and read by President Ross Siragusa, Jr., who kept some of them, and threw others away, but took no action of any kind. Moreover, there was evidence that Admiral officials sough to deceive customers about the fire hazard presented by the color television sets. For example, on July 10, 1967, I. F. Johnston wrote a memorandum about a color television set with a chassis identical to the one in the set owned by Mrs. Gillham:

> We will receive a burned up CD2200 from our Boston Branch which is now approximately 2½ years past warranty.
>
> This set had burned up flyback transformer and it was repaired in our Boston Branch. The customer refused to take the set back but *under pressure and assurance that no more trouble would develop,* finally did so. This transformer was replaced in November 1966.
>
> The set has now not only burned up but also burned the interior of a room and caused considerable damage to the home. The set is being returned here for Lab examination, and we in turn will then forward it to the attention of John Landeck to determine the exact cause of the burning. No doubt lawsuits will follow. [Emphasis added.]

Shortly thereafter, on August 1, 1967, an Admiral field engineer reported a fire caused by an Admiral television set only 17 days after purchase:

> I finally got to inspect the remains of an LN5711 that Gen. Manager John Holmes reported had burned. (See enclosed "C" Report).
>
> This set had really gone, and I understood that a good portion of the customer's house went with it. As near as I can learn it happened about the 23rd or 24th of July after the family had retired for the night. They

were awakened by the family cat, and rushed downstairs to find the TV in flames. By the time they arrived, it was too far gone to do anything but try to save the house, though.

I have no idea how this started. The set was reduced to rubble, and I didn't have the heart to try to call the customer to try to find out more. The set was replaced to him by the Distributor, and I understand his insurance is taking care of the house, and minor burns that the customer suffered getting the TV out.

The record discloses that this was one of seven instances prior to Mrs. Gillham's injury where the fire occurred after the set had been turned off. Some sets burned in dealers' showrooms, even before they were sold. Nevertheless, nine years after Mrs. Gillham's set was marketed, Admiral had not warned its customers of this hazard of which it was fully aware.

Mrs. Gillham contends that the evidence demonstrates that Admiral in designing this television set, in making it available to the public, and in fai'ing to warn prospective customers that the set presented a substantial fire hazard, acted willfully, deliberately, and with a callous disregard for the safety of customers. The willful and deliberate character of Admiral's actions was, she argues, sufficiently reckless and malicious to permit punitive damages under Ohio law.[3]

---

[3] As we have already noted, appellant also asserts that the district court erred in excluding evidence including the existence of Admiral's "fire hazard" files relating to the hundreds of fires occurring after her fire in Admiral color sets identical or substantially similar to her set, and certain other evidence showing Admiral's callous disregard for its customers' safety.

She contends that the "fire hazard" evidence would have reinforced appellant's entitlement to punitive damages by showing that Admiral persisted in its reckless disregard of the safety of its customers after her fire, in the face of steadily mounting numbers of fires occurring in Admiral color television sets in customers' homes, and that Admiral perfected and employed techniques and procedures for concealing the existence of the hazard, by making systematic misrepresentations that there was no such hazard and that no fires, or few fires, had ever occurred in its television sets in response to inquiries and complaints of customers.

Appellant also contends that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the additional cost of building a safe transformer and erroneously excluded an exhibit in which Admiral, in November, 1969, reported to the National Commission on Product Safety regarding the cost of safety features added to its television sets in the previous two years. Admiral reported that adding a "silicone T.O.T." to its "KIO" chassis increased the cost per unit by only sixty cents, and the same safety feature for its H10, K20, and H12 chassis cost only $1.20 per unit.

Admiral, although apparently conceding that its actions were reprehensible, argues that the district court was correct in refusing to permit the award of punitive damages to stand. It contends that in Ohio punitive damages may not be awarded in the absence of proof that the tortfeasor acted with actual malice, and that this record contains no evidence of malice on Admiral's part. Admiral does not suggest that punitive damages may not, as a matter of law, be awarded in products liability actions, but only that the facts of this case do not permit the implication that Admiral acted maliciously.

In *Columbus Finance, Inc.* v. *Howard,* 42 Ohio St. 178 (1975), the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio law required a finding of fraud, insult, or malice to sustain punitive damages, but that "actual malice may be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances." 42 Ohio St. 2d 184. The court also specifically approved the following statement:

> intentional, reckless, wanton, willful and gross acts which cause injury to person or property may be sufficient to evidence that degree of malice required to support an award of punitive damages in tort actions. 42 Ohio St. 2d 184.

The court found, however, that punitive damages were not proper in the case before it because there was no evidence from which malice could be inferred. The plaintiff finance

company had repossessed defendants' furniture because of delinquent payments. Although defendants had a receipt marked paid in full, the plaintiff brought suit seeking judgment by confession on cognovit notes signed by defendants. The damages sought were for the deficiency remaining after the sale of the furniture. Because of an erroneous address on the petition, the defendants had no notice of the suit until after a judgment was entered and a bailiff levied execution on the defendants' automobile. While upholding the award for defendants' compensatory damages for wrongful attachment, the court found no evidence of malice to support punitive damages.

Similarly in *Bush* v. *Kelley's Inc.*, 18 Ohio St. 2d 89, 247 N.E. 2d 745 (1969), the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the term malice "has been given many shades of meaning," and approved among others, the statement:

> "It is an established principle of law in Ohio that in actions to recover damages for tort, which involves the ingredients of fraud, malice, or insult, or the wanton or reckless disregard of the legal rights of others, the jury may go beyond the rule of mere compensation of the party aggrieved, and reward exemplary or punitive damages . . ." 16 Ohio Jurisprudcence 2d 281, Section 145. [Emphasis added.] 18 Ohio St. 2d 93.

In *Columbus Finance*, the Ohio court treated *Smithhilser* v. *Dutter*, 157 Ohio St. 454, 105 N.E. 2d 868 (1957), cited by both parties, as an exception to the general rules regarding punitive damages, to be applied in cases involving alienation of affection of a spouse.

Moreover, under Ohio law it is clear that punitive damages may be awarded against a corporation, such as Admiral. *Western Union Telegraph Co.* v. *Smith*, 64 Ohio St. 106, 59 N.E. 890 (1901). In *Western Union*, a suit for wrongful cutting of plaintiff's trees, the court stated that a corporation could be subjected to punitive damages for the tortious acts of

its agents within the scope of their employment in any case where a natural person acting for himself would be liable for punitive damages. *Ranells* v. *City of Cleveland*, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E. 2d 885 (1975), is not to the contrary. It merely holds punitive damages cannot be assessed against a municipal corporation without specific statutory authorization.

In determining whether the judgment *n.o.v.* was proper the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mrs. Gillham, who secured the jury verdict, and a judgment *n.o.v.* may not be granted unless reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. *Leach* v. *Millers Life Ins. Co.*, 400 F. 2d 179 (5th Cir. 1968), *Teti* v. *Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.*, 392 F. 2d 294 (6th Cir. 1968) (directed verdict). The court of appeals in reviewing the case is also bound by this standard. *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.* v. *Matherne*, 348 F. 2d 394 (5th Cir. 1965).

Therefore the question before us is whether no reasonable person, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mrs. Gillham, and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, could find that Admiral's conduct was so intentional, reckless,[4] wanton, willful, or gross that an inference of malice

---

[4] Application of the rule that punitive damages may be awarded against a tortfeasor who acts in reckless indifference to the safety of others is illustrated in *Gearhart* v. *Angeloff*, 17 Ohio App. 2d 143, 244 N.E. 2d 802 (1969). In that case, a co-owner of a bar sought to evict an unruly patron, and when a scuffle ensued, the other co-owner fired a gun in the direction of the unruly patron and mistakenly grazed the arm of an innocent patron. In affirming the award of punitive damages, the court held, in its syllabus, that "[p]unitive damages may be recovered in an action for negligence where such negligence is so gross as to show a reckless indifference to the rights and safety of other persons." 17 Ohio App. 2d 143. In this appeal, we observe that the district court, in its order granting the motion for the judgment *n.o.v.*, admitted that the evidence could support a conclusion that Admiral had adopted a "cavalier" attitude toward the public safety.

could be drawn. We conclude that the evidence, viewed in light of this standard, was sufficient to permit a reasonable person to conclude that Admiral knew that its design posed a grave danger to the lives and property of its customers, and therefore that its failure to redesign the set or warn the public was conduct sufficiently intentional, reckless, wanton, willful, or gross to permit a reasonable inference of malice.

The record supports the conclusion that Admiral *knew* that its transformers might catch fire because of improper and dangerous design, and that it knew or should have known, even before the set was marketed, that the purported safety device designed to contain the anticipated fires was ineffective. Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that shortly after the set was distributed to the public, and several years before Mrs. Gillham's injury, Admiral was informed that its transformers were causing fires that the safety device was not containing. In spite of this knowledge, and its additional knowledge that its sets were catching fire even when not in use, Admiral neither redesigned the set nor informed purchasers and prospective purchasers of the hazard. It not only continued to distribute the sets, but also misled customers by informing them that the sets were safe.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in granting the judgment *n.o.v.* The district court although concluding that Admiral admittedly was "grossly negligent," believed that its conduct did not show malice. The district court, however, does not sit as trier of fact *de novo;* its function in deciding this motion for judgment *n.o.v.* was limited to determining whether a reasonable person could arrive at the conclusion agreed upon by the jury. We hold that the jury could reasonably draw the requisite inference of malice from Admiral's conduct. Therefore its award of punitive damages and attorneys' fees was proper under Ohio law.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment on the verdict. Costs to appellant.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 74-1398

ZORA H. GILLHAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE ADMIRAL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT

(Filed September 25, 1975)

Before: PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, McCREE, Circuit Judge, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.

APPEAL from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be and the same is hereby reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment on the verdict.

It is further ordered that Plaintiff-Appellant recover from Defendant-Appellee the costs on appeal, as itemized below,

and that execution therefor issue out of said District Court if necessary.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT.

/s/ JOHN P. HEHMAN, Clerk

A True Copy.

Attest:
John P. Hehman, Clerk

Issued as Mandate:

COSTS: To be recovered by Appellant

Filing fee	$ 50.00
Printing	$1394.60
Total	$1444.60

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 74-1398

ZORA H. GILLHAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE ADMIRAL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER

(Filed November 12, 1975)

Before: PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, MCCREE, Circuit Judge and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.

The petition for rehearing with suggestion for a rehearing en banc having come on to be heard, and no judge having requested a vote on the suggestion for en banc consideration, and the petition having therefore been referred to the panel that heard the case, upon consideration, it is ORDERED that the petition be, and it hereby is, DENIED.

Entered by order of the court

/s/ JOHN P. HEHMAN, Clerk

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
JAN 10 1976
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-872

THE ADMIRAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

vs.

ZORA H. GILLHAM,
Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit

---

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

JOHN A. LLOYD, JR.
DANIEL P. DOOLEY
2900 DuBois Tower
511 Walnut Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
(513) 621-8550
Attorneys for Respondent
Zora H. Gillham

OF COUNSEL:
SUSAN GROGAN FALLER
FROST & JACOBS
2900 DuBois Tower
511 Walnut Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
(513) 621-8550

COURT INDEX PRESS, INC. — 809 Walnut Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 — (513) 241-1450

INDEX

	Page
OPINIONS BELOW	1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED	2
QUESTION PRESENTED	2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	2
REASONS CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED	4
I. The Court of Appeals Correctly Decided That Admiral Intentionally, Willfully and Knowingly Exposed Its Customers To A Grave Danger To Life And Property And That The Jury Award Was Therefore Justified Under Ohio Law	4
II. This Case Presents No Full Faith And Credit Question. The Full Faith And Credit Clause Of Article IV Requires That Courts Give Effect To The Judgments Of State Courts, And That Clause Bears No Relationship To The *Stare Decisis* Effect Of State Court Opinions	12
III. This Case Presents No Due Process Of Law Question. No Basis Exists For The Assertion That An Award For Punitive Damages Violates The Due Process Clause Of The Fifth Amendment	13
IV. General Interest To The Entire Manufacturing Industry, The Third Ground Advanced By Petitioner, Is Not A Basis For The Exercise Of Certiorari Jurisdiction	13
CONCLUSION	18

CITATIONS

CASES:

	Page
Atlantic & Great Western Ry. Co. v. *Dunn*, 19 Ohio St. 162 (1869)	8
Bagley v. *General Fire Extinguisher Co.*, 212 U.S. 477 (1909)	12
Bush v. *Kelley's, Inc.*, 18 Ohio St.2d 89 (1969)	8
Columbus Finance, Inc. v. *Howard*, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178 (1975)	9
Gearhart v. *Angeloff*, 17 Ohio App.2d 143 (1969)	9
Hafner v. *Guerlain, Inc.*, 34 App. Div.2d 162, 310 N.Y.S. 2d 141 (1970)	14, 16
Helvering v. *Mitchell*, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)	13
Hoffman v. *Sterling Drug, Inc.*, 485 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir. 1973)	14
Johnson v. *Stackhouse Oldsmobile*, 27 Ohio St. 2d 140 (1971)	10
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. *Matherne*, 348 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1965)	11
Leach v. *Millers Life Insurance Co.*, 400 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1968)	11
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. *Hunt*, 320 U.S. 430 (1943)	12
Manning v. *Len Immke Buick*, 28 Ohio App.2d 203 (1971)	10
Moore v. *Jewel Tea Co.*, 253 N.E. 2d 636, *aff'd* 263 N.E.2d 103 (Sup. Ct., Ill., 1969)	14

	Page
Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. *Yeldell*, 274 U.S. 112 (1927)	13
Railroad Co. v. *Hutchins*, 37 Ohio St. 282 (1881)	9
Roberts v. *Mason*, 10 Ohio St. 277 (1859)	7, 8
Roginsky v. *Richardson-Merrell, Inc.*, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967)	14, 15, 16
Royal Furniture Co. v. *Weist*, 23 OCC NS 425 (1912)	9
Saberton v. *Greenwald*, 146 Ohio St. 414 (1946)	7, 9
Smithhisler v. *Dutter*, 157 Ohio St. 454 (1952)	6
Soucy v. *Greyhound Corp.*, 27 App. Div. 2d 112, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 173 (1967)	14, 16
Standard Oil Co. v. *Gunn*, 234 Ala. 598, 176 So. 322 (1937)	14
Teti v. *Firestone Tire And Rubber Co.*, 392 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1968)	11
Toole v. *Richardson-Merrell, Inc.*, 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967)	14, 15
United States v. *Regan*, 232 U.S. 37 (1914)	13
United States v. *Zucker*, 161 U.S. 475 (1896)	13
Williamson Heater Co. v. *Radich*, 128 Ohio St. 124 (1934)	7

U.S. CONSTITUTION: Page

U.S. Constitution Article IV 12

U.S. Constitution Amendment V 13

STATUTES:

15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 17

28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) 2

28 U.S.C. § 1738 12

REGULATIONS:

Supreme Court of the United States Rule 19.1. (b) 2, 6

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 (b) 2

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 246 (1965) 13

Morris, *Punitive Damages in Tort Cases,* 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1931) 13

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-872

THE ADMIRAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

vs.

ZORA H. GILLHAM,
Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit

---

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the district court has not been reported. It appears at page 1a of the appendix to the petition.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, dated September 25, 1975, reversing the district court's order, is reported at 523 F.2d 102, and appears beginning at page 10a of the appendix to the petition.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

There are no constitutional provisions arguably involved. The only statutory provision involved is 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1). The only regulation involved is Rule 19.1. (b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the Court of Appeals correctly decide there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's conclusion that petitioner's conduct relative to a known fire hazard in its Admiral color television sets justified exemplary damages and attorneys' fees?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Zora H. Gillham (the respondent herein) brought this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against petitioner, The Admiral Corporation (Admiral), seeking compensatory and exemplary damages for severe burns and serious complications resulting therefrom caused by a fire which erupted in her Admiral color television set in her home in Cincinnati, Ohio, in November 1968. The district court had jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship between the parties and claims in excess of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs (app. 11a).[1]

The district court ordered that the issues of liability and the amounts of damages be tried separately, pursuant to Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A

[1] Appendix references herein are to the appendix to the petition for certiorari.

jury trial of these matters was conducted before the Honorable Carl B. Rubin, District Judge, in December 1973. The jury found The Admiral Corporation liable for Mrs. Gillham's injuries. Her claims for compensatory and exemplary damages were then presented to the same jury. The court permitted the question of exemploary damages to go to the jury despite Admiral's motion for a directed verdict denying such dagames. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $125,000, exemplary damages of $100,000, and attorneys' fees of $50,000 (app. 11a).

The district court then granted Admiral's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and vacated the award for exemplary damages and attorneys' fees. In the order granting Admiral's motion, the trial court found that "[t]he evidence can reasonably be interpreted to indicate that [Admiral] was . . . grossly negligent in its design of the television set, in its subsequent activities, and in its failure to warn customers of the potential fire hazard." (app. 2a).

Respondent appealed the district court's order to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in granting the judgment n.o.v. After a thorough and detailed analysis of the evidence, the Court of Appeals stated:

> Therefore the question before us is whether no reasonable person, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mrs. Gillham, and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, could find that Admiral's conduct was so intentional, reckless, wanton, willful, or gross that an inference of malice could be drawn. We conclude that the evidence, viewed in light of this standard, was sufficient to permit a reasonable person to conclude that Admiral knew that its design posed a grave danger to the lives and property of its customers, and therefore that its failure to re-

design the set or warn the public was conduct sufficiently intentional, reckless, wanton, willful, or gross to permit a reasonable inference of malice (app. 21-22a).

It is this conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and the order of judgment based thereon, which petitioner seeks to have this Court review.

REASONS CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT ADMIRAL INTENTIONALLY, WILLFULLY AND KNOWINGLY EXPOSED ITS CUSTOMERS TO A GRAVE DANGER TO LIFE AND PROPERTY AND THAT THE JURY AWARD WAS THEREFORE JUSTIFIED UNDER OHIO LAW.

Petitioner urges that under Ohio law its conduct should not have been found by the jury and the Court of Appeals to have been malicious, but petitioner purposefully avoids alluding to the evidence, or to its conduct toward the respondent and other members of the public. The Court of Appeals devoted much of its opinion to a detailed analysis of the evidence regarding Admiral's conduct, because, as that Court correctly stated, the question before it was whether the evidence justified the jury's verdict. We will not repeat that Court's analysis, but will summarize Admiral's behavioral pattern with reference to Mrs. Gillham.

As the Court of Appeals noted, "The facts are not disputed." (app. 12a). "Admiral, although apparently conceding that its actions were reprehensible, argues that the

district court was correct in refusing to permit the award of punitive damages to stand." (app. 19a).

The fire which inflicted Mrs. Gillham's injuries originated in the defectively designed high voltage transformer in her color television set. Admiral's designer of that transformer admitted that when he designed it he anticipated that it might catch fire in customers' homes. Admiral's own heat tests showed that the transformer subjected its paper and wax insulation to temperatures higher than those recommended, which created a fire hazard. Admiral therefore enclosed the transformer in a cage, but the cage had ventilation holes and a top held with plastic rivets. The cage would not and did not contain fires, and Admiral knew this. Beginning in October 1964, reports of fires in customers' homes were made to Admiral in a steady stream so that by November 1968, when Mrs. Gillham's set burned, at least 91 such fires had been reported to Admiral. Many of those fires involved personal injuries and property damage. Two years before Mrs. Gillham's fire an Admiral engineer tested 16 similar transformers, all of which burned, and he wondered . . . "that more failures did not occur." Admiral's National Electronic Service Manager admitted that he knew these transformers were the "major source" of fires in Admiral color television sets, and the president of Admiral received reports of the fires (app. 12-17a).

It was on the basis of these facts that the Court of Appeals found, "The evidence thus demonstrated that when Admiral designed, manufactured and marketed [Mrs. Gillham's] television set it knew that the set presented a serious fire hazard." Admiral not only did nothing to warn owners or prospective purchasers of this hazard, but it misled those who inquired by informing them that the sets were safe (app. 16-17a).

Petitioner has made no showing of entitlement to review on writ of certiorari based upon the only ground available to it under Supreme Court Rule 19.1. (b). As this is a diversity case in which Ohio law applies, the sole basis for review would be that the Court of Appeals had decided an important state question in conflict with applicable Ohio law. An understanding of the pronouncements of the Ohio courts on the subject of punitive damages and the uncontradicted evidence in this case demonstrates that it was the district court which decided a question of Ohio law in a way in conflict with applicable Ohio law, and that the Court of Appeals' reversal of the district court's order is consistent with applicable Ohio law.

Quoting one fragment of the syllabus from *Smithhisler* v. *Dutter,* 157 Ohio St. 454 (1952), petitioner seeks to convince this Court, that, in reviewing the order of the district court, the Court of Appeals misinterpreted and misapplied Ohio law. Petitioner relies solely on the first paragraph of that syllabus, which states:

> 1. In tort actions, the question of punitive damages *may not ordinarily* be submitted to a jury in the absence of actual malice. (Emphasis added.)

Petitioner failed to inform this Court of the second paragraph of the syllabus from the *Smithhisler* case, which states what may ordinarily be done, in the following terms:

> 2. In an action for alienation of affections of a spouse, where the alienator's only purpose was to acquire such affections for himself and his acts in accomplishing the alienation were wrongful, unlawful and intentional and the natural and probable result of the acts was the accomplishment of the alienation, malice may be implied as a justification for an award of punitive damages.

Petitioner has also studiously avoided mentioning the following syllabus paragraph from the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in *Saberton* v. *Greenwald,* 146 Ohio St. 414 (1946):

> In an action to recover damages for a tort which involves the ingredients of fraud, malice or insult, a jury may go beyond the rule of mere compensation to the party aggrieved and award exemplary or punitive damages. (*Roberts* v. *Mason,* 10 Ohio St., 277, approved and followed.)

In *Roberts* v. *Mason,* which the *Saberton* syllabus approved and followed, the Ohio Supreme Court published the following syllabi:

> 1. In an action to recover damages for a tort which involves the ingredients of fraud, malice, or insult, a jury may go beyond the rule of mere compensation to the party aggrieved, and award exemplary or punitive damages; and this they may do, although the defendant may have been punished criminally for the same wrong.
> 2. In such a case, the jury may, in their estimate of *compensatory* damages, take into consideration and include reasonable fees of counsel employed by the plaintiff in the prosecution of his action.

Moreover, petitioner's argument is overly restrictive. The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized in a syllabus that a syllabus paragraph ". . . must be interpreted with reference to the facts upon which it is predicated and the questions presented to and considered by the Court." *Williamson Heater Co.* v. *Radich,* 128 Ohio St. 124 (1934). It therefore cannot be credibly asserted that statements in opinions by the Ohio Supreme Court interpreting what that court considers to be the law are without precedential value.

In the opinion in *Roberts* v. *Mason* the court made the following answer to a challenge to the propriety of punitive damage awards:

> [I]t seems to us, that if any thing can be settled by judicial decision and long and general practice, this doctrine must be regarded as thus settled . . . . The rule was distinctly recognized in Stevens v. Handly, Wright, 121, and in Simpson v. McCaffrey, 13 Ohio, 522; and ever since either of us have had any acquaintance with the jurisprudence of Ohio, the rule has been considered, so far as we know, established and elementary. If an alteration of the rule were deemed desirable, therefore, it would come more properly from the legislature than from us. But we are not prepared to recommend any such alteration. In a case of this kind, twelve intelligent and impartial men, acting under oath, and subject, in a proper case, to the control of the court, are not likely to do any great wrong; and it seems to us that the power which this rule confers upon a jury, may, in practice, operate as a salutary restraint upon the evil passions of bad men. (10 Ohio St. at 280)

Chief Justice Brinkerhoff, who delivered the opinion in *Roberts,* further elaborated upon the policy behind punitive damages in his opinion in *Atlantic & Great Western Ry. Co.* v. *Dunn,* 19 Ohio St. 162, 170 (1869):

> It rests not on the ground of abstract or theoretical justice, but on the ground of public policy — a policy which seeks to promote the public safety; to punish, through the medium of a civil proceeding, a fraudulent, malicious, insulting, or wilful wrongdoer, and to hold him up as a warning example to others, to deter them from offending in like manner.

More recently, in *Bush* v. *Kelley's, Inc.,* 18 Ohio St. 2d 89, 93 (1969), the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its

position on punitive damages when it quoted with approval the rule as it is set forth in Ohio Jurisprudence 2d:

> It is an established principle of law in Ohio that in actions to recover damages for tort, which involves the ingredients of fraud, malice, or insult, or *the wanton or reckless disregard of the legal rights of others,* the jury may go beyond the rule of mere compensation of the party aggrieved, and reward exemplary or punitive damages. * * * 16 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 281, Section 145. (Emphasis added.)

See also *Railroad Company* v. *Hutchins,* 37 Ohio St. 282 (1881); *Royal Furniture Company* v. *Weist,* 23 OCC NS 425 (1912); *Gearhart* v. *Angeloff,* 17 Ohio App. 2d 143 (1969), the syllabus of which states:

> Punitive damages may be recovered in an action for negligence *where such negligence is so gross as to show a reckless indifference to the rights and safety of other persons.* (Emphasis added.)

The latest decision of the Ohio Supreme Court regarding punitive damages is *Columbus Finance, Inc.* v. *Howard,* 42 Ohio St.2d 178 (1975), an action for wrongful execution in which punitive damages were denied because there was "absolutely no evidence from which actual malice upon the part of [the defendant] can be inferred." The court stated, however, that "This broad statement is also correct; actual malice may be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances." (42 Ohio St. 2d at 184)

There are several Ohio cases involving the sale of defective products in which the courts have upheld awards of punitive damages. In *Saberton* v. *Greenwald,* 146 Ohio St. 414 (1946), the Ohio Supreme Court held that it was error for a trial court to refuse to charge a jury that punitive damages might be recovered where the defendant sold

to plaintiff, as new, a wrist watch which defendant knew had been used and was defective. In support of its judgment the court adopted the rule stated in 13 Ohio Jurisprudence 235, Section 137, that punitive damages may properly be awarded where ". . . the defendant's conduct shows a wanton or reckless disregard of the legal rights of others. . . ." (146 Ohio St. at 425)

It is noteworthy, also, that in two cases Ohio courts upheld awards of punitive damages against automobile dealers who misrepresented the condition of used cars to customers. *Johnson* v. *Stackhouse Oldsmobile,* 27 Ohio St. 2d 140 (1971); *Manning* v. *Len Immke Buick,* 28 Ohio App. 2d 203 (1971).

Respondent therefore submits that the Court of Appeals was correct in determining that the law of Ohio permits a jury to award punitive damages where a defendant knowingly sells a hazardous product to a plaintiff who is injured by the known hazard. As products cases, by their nature, involve wrongdoing which exposes a multiplicity of persons to danger, the interest of the public in deterring the wrongdoer from continuing its reckless behavior is greater than it is in cases where the defendant's wrongdoing endangers only one person.

It is well settled that Ohio law permits a party who is injured by another's reckless, callous or wanton disregard for his safety to recover punitive damages. To design a color TV set knowing that it was fire hazardous, and to market it without any warning, should, in itself, support punitive damages. But, to pursue a conscious policy of concealing this hazard in the face of staggering evidence of its magnitude, thereby subjecting this respondent and countless other purchasers to the risk which devastated Mrs. Gillham, is classic outrageous behavior, reckless and callous beyond the power to gainsay. If the evidence in this case

does not support a verdict for exemplary damages and attorneys' fees, one can hardly imagine the case which would support such a verdict.

Bearing in mind that judgment n.o.v. is not to be granted if any reasonable mind can reconcile the verdict with the evidence,[2] the extreme error committed by the district court is brought into focus. In granting judgment n.o.v. for Admiral, the district court substituted its judgment for that of the jury, and held, in effect, that, as a matter of law, punitive damages are not recoverable in Ohio based upon the evidence in this case. As the Court of Appeals stated, however, the district court did not sit as the trier of the facts *de novo,* and, thus, had no right to make such a decision (app. 22a). What the district court's change of mind discloses is that that court first correctly assessed the evidence as justifying the imposition of punitive damages and so charged the jury, and, after the verdict, incorrectly reconsidered the Ohio law and vacated the verdict. The judgment of the Court of Appeals from which relief is now sought represents that Court's accord with the district court's correct original assessment of the law and the evidence.

---

[2] *Leach* v. *Millers Life Insurance Co.,* 400 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1968); *Teti* v. *Firestone Tire And Rubber Co.,* 392 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1968); *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.* v. *Matherne,* 348 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1965).

II. THIS CASE PRESENTS NO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT QUESTION. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF ARTICLE IV REQUIRES THAT COURTS GIVE EFFECT TO THE JUDGMENTS OF STATE COURTS, AND THAT CLAUSE BEARS NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE STARE DECISIS EFFECT OF STATE COURT OPINIONS.

Petitioner offers no authority for its contention that the judgment of the Court of Appeals violates the Full Faith and Credit clause. Indeed, no such authority exists. As long ago as 1909 Justice Holmes made it clear that the Full Faith and Credit clause of Article IV applies only to state court judgments and judicial proceedings as between the parties to those proceedings. *Bagley* v. *General Fire Extinguisher Co.*, 212 U.S. 477 (1909). See also *Magnolia Petroleum Co.* v. *Hunt*, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). Nor does the statutory requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 that United States courts give Full Faith and Credit to the records and judicial proceedings of state courts contain any provision supporting petitioner's argument.

Thus, even if the judgment of the Court of Appeals were arguably at variance with the body of Ohio precedent concerning exemplary damages, which it is not, this case would not present a Full Faith and Credit issue.

III. THIS CASE PRESENTS NO DUE PROCESS OF LAW QUESTION. NO BASIS EXISTS FOR THE ASSERTION THAT AN AWARD FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.

In *Pizitz Dry Goods Co.* v. *Yeldell*, 274 U.S. 112 (1927), this Court stated that the imposition of a punitive damages award does not violate Due Process rights. Petitioner refers to no authority in support of its Due Process argument, and a search of the case law indicates that no such authority exists. Petitioner's endeavor to equate punitive damages with civil penalties and forfeitures is likewise unavailing. Civil penalties and forfeitures have been held to pose no threat to Due Process rights. *United States* v. *Regan*, 232 U.S. 37 (1914); *United States* v. *Zucker*, 161 U.S. 475 (1896); *Helvering* v. *Mitchell*, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); see generally 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 246 (1965); Morris, *Punitive Damages in Tort Cases*, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1195-1198 (1931).

IV. GENERAL INTEREST TO THE ENTIRE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, THE THIRD GROUND ADVANCED BY PETITIONER, IS NOT A BASIS FOR THE EXERCISE OF CERTIORARI JURISDICTION.

Petitioner asserts that the judgment of the Court of Appeals threatens financial disaster to the manufacturing community. Even if this contention were well considered, which it is not, it would not constitute a basis for certiorari jurisdiction. Moreover, it lies poorly with Admiral to plead that its egregious conduct should go unpunished be-

cause other manufacturers will fear similar consequences. The Court of Appeals did not in this case invent the right to recover exemplary damages. It merely applied an established principle of Ohio law. This same principle has been recognized by the courts in at least five other states.[3]

Roginsky v. *Richardson-Merrell, Inc.*, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), cited by petitioner, is one of two similar actions seeking punitive damages against the same drug manufacturer but achieving opposite appellate results at almost the same time. The other case is *Toole* v. *Richardson-Merrell, Inc.*, 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). In both actions juries awarded plaintiffs punitive damages on essentially the same evidence. The award in *Roginsky* was set aside by the Second Circuit. The award in *Toole* was affirmed by the California Court of Appeals.

At issue in the *Richardson-Merrell* cases was whether awards of punitive damages were supportable under New York and California law where the evidence disclosed that the company's scientists deliberately withheld clearly damaging evidence of the deleterious effects of the cholesterol-reducing drug triparanol, leading persons to develop cataracts, hair loss and flaky skin conditions. In *Roginsky* the Second Circuit reversed the award chiefly because the

[3] Alabama: *Standard Oil Co.* v. *Gunn*, 234 Ala. 598, 176 So. 322 (1937);
California: *Toole* v. *Richardson-Merrell, Inc.*, 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967);
Illinois: *Moore* v. *Jewel Tea Co.*, 253 N E. 2d 636, *aff'd.* 263 N.E. 2d 103 (Sup. Ct., Ill., 1969);
Pennsylvania: *Hoffman* v. *Sterling Drug Inc.*, 485 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir. 1973);
New York: *Soucy* v. *Greyhound Corp.*, 27 App. Div. 2d 112, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 173 (1967); *Hafner* v. *Guerlain Inc.*, 34 App. Div. 2d 162, 310 N.Y.S. 2d 141 (1970).

evidence did not satisfy New York's complicity rule[4] since "there was no proof from which a jury could properly conclude that defendant's officers manifested deliberate disregard for human welfare. . . ." (378 F.2d at 850)

Upon a similar record the California Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence in the *Toole* case to support the jury inference that high level management participated in the policy of nondisclosure so as to satisfy California's complicity rule, and upheld the award of punitive damages.

In the *Richardson-Merrell* cases the manufacturer took the drug off the market and warned the public of its dangerous effects within two years after it was marketed. In this case, however, Admiral had not at the time of the trial, nine years after the fire hazardous sets were marketed, given any warning of the hazard to anyone. If Richardson-Merrell had pursued a similar policy of continuing indifference to public safety, the Second Circuit would have concluded that punitive damages were warranted in *Roginsky*. In Judge Friendly's words:

> Sufficient proof would also be furnished if, after the drug had been placed on the market, the manufacturer was shown to have become aware of the danger and to have done nothing, deliberately closing its eyes. 378 F.2d at 843.

In the *Toole* case the California court found that evidence showing that the company continued to claim that its product was safe, despite knowledge to the contrary, justified punitive damages under the California standard

[4] Ohio has no such rule. If it had, the rule would have been no obstacle to punitive damages in this case because the evidence shows that "claims against Admiral arising from fires were circulated to and read by President Ross Siragusa, Jr., who kept some of them, and threw others away, but took no action of any kind." (app. 17a).

which provides that a corporation may be held liable for punitive damage for acts done with ill-will, motivated by actual malice, or done under circumstances amounting to fraud or oppression. Malice was deemed established by a showing of the company's reckless disregard of the safety of the public.

That the New York rule is less restrictive than the Second Circuit would lead one to believe in *Roginsky* is illustrated by the test stated by the New York Supreme Court in *Hafner* v. *Guerlain,* 34 App. Div. 2d 162, 310 N.Y.S. 2d 141 (1970), an action for compensatory and punitive damages for injuries sustained from the use of perfume. In *Hafner* the court expressed the New York standard for punitive damages as requiring proof of a conscious disregard of the rights of others, or recklessness on the part of the defendant, and referred to the New York rule regarding punitive damages generally, which was stated in *Soucy* v. *Greyhound Corp.,* 27 App. Div. 2d 112, 276 N.Y.S. 2d 173 (1967), a product liability case, in which the Supreme Court, Appellate Division said:

> We find no merit in appellant's contention that exemplary damages are not allowable in personal injury actions based on negligence if such negligence amounts to flagrant misconduct. Such has long been the well established law in this State [citation omitted] and . . . we find no constitutional barriers to the assessment of exemplary damages in civil proceedings. While an award of such damages is concededly punitive, it is in our opinion, in fact, a private remedial remedy rather than a public criminal sanction [citations omitted]. Moreover, while actual malice is a requisite to the allowance of punitive damages, such may be established . . . '. . . [also] by showing that [the act] was committed recklessly or wantonly, i.e., without regard to the rights of the plaintiff, or of people in general.' [citations omitted]. 276 N.Y.S. 2d at 175.

Petitioner's argument that punitive damages have no current social utility in product liability cases because the Consumer Product Safety Act[5] now operates to deter manufacturers from marketing products they know to be unsafe, is devoid of merit. There is no effective deterrent in that Act, which was enacted four years after Mrs. Gillham's fire. At any rate, the Consumer Product Safety Act has been demonstrably ineffectual in deterring Admiral which, as a matter of record evidence, gave the public no warning of the known hazard in its television sets after the Act became effective.

---

[5] Public Law 92-573, enacted October 27, 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081.

CONCLUSION

In its eleventh hour attempt to escape paying a judgment in a diversity case, petitioner has fabricated unsupportable theories of constitutional law and has advanced an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of Ohio law. Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the judgment of the Court of Appeals case presents no question of constitutional dimension; nor does it represent a conflict with the law of Ohio. The reversal of the district court's order was predicated solely upon the Court of Appeals' recognition that the evidence of petitioner's cruel concealment of an identifiable safety hazard in its television sets makes it impossible to reconcile the judgment n.o.v. with Ohio's criteria for awarding exemplary damages. We respectfully submit that the writ should be denied.

JOHN A. LLOYD, JR.
DANIEL P. DOOLEY

Attorneys for Respondent
Zora H. Gillham

2900 DuBois Tower
511 Walnut Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
(513) 621-8550

OF COUNSEL:

SUSAN GROGAN FALLER
FROST & JACOBS

2900 DuBois Tower
511 Walnut Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
(513) 621-8550